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EDITOR'S PAGE
We would like to call attention to the Student Fonun which starts on the
page next door to us here. Associate Editor John Saxon, a University o£
Alabama debater, has assembled several very interesting short essays which
should prove thought-provoking to debaters, coaches, and others concerned
with the forensic scene today.
We'll let you read these perceptive observations for yourself, without
pointing out which ones struck us as particularly appropriate and, as they
say, relevant. There is in these commentaries not only a sharp-eyed critique
of educational forensics, but also some material which suggests considerable
awareness of some of the theoretical tensions within the field of argumenta
tion.
Within the past few volumes of Speaker and Gavel a substantial effort has
been made to publish reflections on forensic activities by those who are most
numerous within them, the student participants. In the May 1965 issue, for
instance, "Critical Look at a Concept" provided an evaluation of the student
congress by Lynda Rummel, an Oregon State student. More recendy, the
Student Forum in May 1970 included essays on debate judging by Tim
Wright of Washington and Lee, Kathy Shirley of WiUiam and Mary, Richard
Raum of Vermont, and Tom Walsh and David Bawcom of Texas Tech. I
must also mention, of course, the revolutionary article in the November 1970
issue by Richard Dean of DePauw, "Tournament Debating: A Case for
Guerrilla Warfare." Finally, last March, Kentucky debater John S. Nelson
gave us his well-reasoned "That Reahty Gap and the Rhetoric of Distortion."
We are pleased to be able to provide a shop window for the display of all
of these student viewpoints.
We don't feel that we have yet created a real dialogue, and it may be that
technicalities such as publishing schedules make genuine give and take diffi
cult in these pages, but we still wiU welcome responses by students and other
members who may find grounds for agreement or disagreement with the
positions which these authors have assumed. Let the debate about debate
proceed.
Speaking of response, we also will be happy to consider reactions which
you may have to the other articles which appear in this issue. Griticism of
any kind has its methodologies and its constituents, must be able to stand up
to serious scrutiny, but it also inherently generates value judgments which
are most appropriately given fresh and vivid expression. Although we are
aware that 1972 is an election year, this issue was not intentionally designed
as a campaign document. The subject matter and the value conclusions are
clearly of political as well as rhetorical concern this year, and if other view




Speaker & Gavel, Vol. 9, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 1
https://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/speaker-gavel/vol9/iss3/1
SPEAKER AND GAVEL 71
STUDENT FORUM
DOES DEBATE MEET ITS AVOWED PURPOSES?
STATEMENT OF INTRODUCTION
John Saxon, University of Alabama
Student Editor, Speaker and Gavel
It has been with great interest that I have read articles in the recent
hterature of the speech profession examining the process of academic debate
as currently practiced on the national coUegiate circuit. This examination
has not been limited, it should be pointed out, merely to the literatrue of
the profession, but is indeed heard among the casual colloquies at debate
tournaments, speech conventions, and informally "wherever two or more
are gathered together in its name." The professional literatrue, although not
yet to the point of having reached concensus on or having stimulated an
exhaustive discussion of the above, has raised some important questions
about the avowed objectives of academic debate and whether or not those
objectives are being met as debate is currently practiced. However, the input
has been almost entirely from tire perspective of speech professor, theoreti
cian, or coach, with little or no input from debaters themselves.
In my capacity as student editor of the Speaker and Gavel, I have sought
to reduce this paucity of student input toward the vital issues of the practice
with which we occupy our time and energies. You wiU find in this issue a
student symposium in which the objectives of debate are explored, with
personal reflection as to whether or not those objectives are being met. It
was hoped that some of the following questions would be considered: Is
debate a process to train students to be effective public advocates, articulate
and cogent in the process of oral communication? Is it merely to teach the
elements of critical decision-making or does it go deeper as a means to search
for truth? Is it all of these, or none of them? Does debate meet its avowed
puiposels) or has it degenerated into an exercise on sophistry, replete with
superficial reasoning, "spread" debating, over-reliance on evidence, shallow
analysis, etc.? Is academic debate "better" now than in the past? Is there
indeed a difference between theory and practice? If so, how is that differ
ence eliminated?
You will find in the following the responses of three debaters to my initial
questions. To these three I send my sincerest thanks. It is hoped, however,
tbat this is only the beginning. Reactions or reflections from coaches, in
structors, and especially debaters are welcome, and will possibly be featured
in a future symposium.
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DEBATE: THE LATEST EDITION OF THE 3M
BOOKSHELF GAMES
Frank England, University of Tennessee
My first connection with the Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Com
pany was in the first grade when my teacher sealed my lips with famous
Scotch tape. Now I am a college speech major and am writing an open letter
to 3M suggesting a new game. For those of you who have not had the expe
rience of the 3M Bookshelf Games, they are compact experiences of life. You
can nm for President, nm a corporation, and play the stock market.
Debate would really make a fine game. It would begin with a move simi
lar to the game of Scrabble, in which each player tries to rearrange the
modifiers and verbs to see how many topics he can get from one. The heart
of tie game would be an eight-foot plastic box with 47 "issue" slots on each
side. Each team has 30 minutes to see how many of their 8,000 cards they
can cram into those slots. This is the basic game. You can play with such
options as: (1) If you roll 7, II, or doubles, you may incorporate the "added
time rule." This way you get an extra 45 seconds on every speech and 5 min
utes between speeches. (2) If you roll snake eyes, your rate of speaking is
tripled (you may add three more members to your team to cram cards into
those slots. And of course, the name of the game is—Educational Experience.
A couple of years ago, when I walked out of my first round of "top-level
varsity" debate, I saw a former debater from a "major debate power." I com
mented that debate seemed to be a game between machines throwing out as
many evidence cards as possible. I was expecting to get a speech on the
value of such an "educational experience" as debate, but was shocked when
he simply rephed with a "That's right, it's just a game."
Being around this sort of debate, anyone is bound to pick up some of the
tactics used. Being exposed to and beaten by such tactics makes the first-
and second-year debater think that's what is expected from him. I've heard
those "debate is a great educational experience, seeking truth, and training
you to be articulate and able to make decisions" sermons since I was in high
school debate. It is rare, however, that this grand-sounding theory is visible
in practice; and that's one reason several very successful debaters from high
school and novice college debate have quit. Each person has to decide
whether, on the basis of his experience, debate is what he thinks it should be.
I think most debaters will agree, however, that there is a gap between fact
and theory.
The change must come within each debater. It is difficult to resist the
"game" tactics used by others. I was impressed, however, with the gentle
man from Miami who commented at DSR-TKA Nationals last year that he
was going to debate the way he thought he should debate, without regard to
win-loss. He was preparing to become a lawyer and was going to adapt his
style more to what would be used in his occupation. I don't know of any
occupation that can be prepared for by throwing cards and whizzing by the
ears of the listeners. (That is unless you're training to be a combination
circus barker and riverboat gambler.)
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A FOUNDATION OF COMPETITION
Ron Palmieri, University of Southern California
In an attempt to delineate the objectives of academic debate, I am left
with the perplexing reahty of Hamlet's words: "There are more things in
heaven and earth Horatio than are dreamt of in our philosophy." Indeed, the
multifarious possibilities that each individual could suggest as vahd purposes
for argumentation are too numerous to consider. Thus, my realization and
contention is that debate has no general purpose!
In saying this I am not by any means denying the value of academic de
bate, but rather reinforcing it on an existential level. My hehef is that each
debater must establish objectives for himself and then attempt to attain them.
I reject quite strenuously an overpowering set of goals that is revered and
cherished as "correct" and "proper." By accepting such things as absolutes,
one denies the fundamental right of the individual to choose which aspect
of debate he wishes to emphasize in his career. The true conundrum for
every Sartrean debater around the nation is determining what deserves high
priority consideration in this academic sport. In line with my existential
philosophical position, I can only give you my uncanny individual opinion
on this subject.
It seems unfortunate to me that many coaches consider it had taste for an
individual to desire, above vntually all else, to win. Although shocking and
no doubt vulgar to admit, I primarily debate to suceed. I heheve I am in a
minority, but certainly a much larger minority than is vocally audible. Most
people on the circuit refuse to admit to this position for it runs diametrically
counter to current accepted mores of our community. The paradoxical fact is,
however, that those who at first glance would appear to be disagreeing with
my goal as paramount would, upon further examination, fall into the category
they abhor.
Those who portray debate as an "educational experience" never tell you
what good the education does you once you have achieved it. The tacit fact
is that an education in argumentation to acquire skdls to express yourself
succinctly, intelligently and persuasively is an education to enable you to win
at endeavors within and outside the debate circle. Argumentation as a
learning device for critical decision-making and strategic moves is of no con
sequence imless the end result is that the decisions you make are correct, the
tactics you choose are the best and the final outcome of the encounter is the
attainment of your desired goal.
Although we like to think of debate in ideahstic terms, I have discovered
and will avidly contend that debate is truly a foundation of competition
that is going to follow us throughout our lives. Perhaps I should he naive
and utopianistic until I leave the debate community, but I am too cognizant
of reality not to be constantly aware that my abihty to adapt in debate rounds
is a small-scale "conflict, concensus and compromise" format that will he
repeated countless times in the years to come. I am pleased to say that I have
succeeded in my debate career, and that this success has carried over into
other aspects of my life. Debate has served its purpose for me and it has
truly become an integral part of my being that wiU undoubtedly influence
the rest of my existence regardless of what I do or where I decide to con
tinue my endeavors.
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"EXCELLENCE IN WHAT?"
Joseph Pekkins, University of Alabama
A question attracting nearly as much attention as the national debate topic
for the last year and a half is one concerning the practice of intercollegiate
debate itself—^what are the purposes of intercollegiate debate? Answers
from debaters and coaches alike range from the ideahstic to the existential
in nature. Yet most of the answers I have heard have arisen through a con
sideration of the debate program as an entity in and of itself. In my personal
opinion, this is an approach to the question which misses a more crucial issue.
Intercollegiate debate quite obviously could not take place without colleges
and universities; it is a part of the whole and not the whole itself. One must
keep in mind that debate programs are dependent on these institutions and
not vice versa. Upon this premise I would assert further that debate being
a part of the whole should contribute primarily to the goal of the institution.
That goal in my personal judgment is first and foremost the education of
students. If any segment of the institution thwarts this goal, or if it achieves
it only accidentally, then its inclusion in the structure of the institution would
seem to be in serious question. Thus the crucial issue is whether debate in its
proper context strives foremost and primarily for an educational goal.
Debate has served my own education well. Indeed the research tech
niques, argumentation skills and experiences of travel to name a few have
been unique benefits gained through the discipline. However, during past
years I have observed practices which call for serious examination. For
example, the increased use of mimeographed evidence must make one
wonder what type of research techniques are being taught. A student who
receives his testimonium ex machina cannot be expected to apply the tests
of valid evidence. Furthermore, when one sees evidence carried in shopping
carts and three-suiters one must wonder how the individual debater managed
to compile such vast amounts of evidence through personal, scholarly re
search. Personally, it seems inconceivable that the student using duphcated
evidence or carrying it in such quantities could have done the research, know
the context of the evidence or form scholarly research habits.
Another questionable practice is the way in which the national proposition
is being approached. The AFA Code of Standards indicates that "intercol
legiate debate programs and tournaments should provide training in effective,
intelligent and responsible advocacy." Yet the stretching of the proposition
to the hmits of its letter in order to overwhelm the opponent with surprise
seems hardly conducive to this "responsible advocacy." Regrettably, a poorly
worded proposition has exacerbated this tendency this year. Granted, these
approaches have forced many negatives to flex some flabby mental muscles;
however, this cannot redeem the affirmative teams which have chosen to
seek victory by debating unrelated rather than central areas of the question.
For some reason it hardly seems "responsible" to advocate issues which
sidestep direct, well-researched clash in favor of striking at the unthought of
and seemingly unrelated.
These current practices of our collegiate programs, among others, call for
serious consideration. It is quite true that such practices can contribute
greatly to the winning record of a team. But if this success is accepted as
the criterion for effective, responsible advocacy, the primary goal must be
subordinated. Such practices as cited above are oriented toward winning
8
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and winning alone. Indeed, the student subjected to such methods would
seem to be the worse instead of better trained scholar. If we accept this cri
terion for designing debate programs, the primary goal becomes winning; the
education which does take place is an accidental rather than necessary
quality. If this is the priority of goals one must question whether the thou
sands of dollars spent on some dozen students by an institution are warranted.
It undoubtedly will be said that wirming is the sign of excellence. But the
question is, "Excellence in what?" Certainly a trophy case filled with tro
phies indicates that debaters have excelled in their discipline. Yet, quite
ideahstically, I would contend that if that excellence is in a sophistic display
of one-upmanship, the victory is hoUow and meaningless.
This conclusion is, of course, based on my own personal value system, and
the premises set forth here. Whether the reader agrees or disagrees with
this conclusion I hope he will not allow the initial inquiry of this essay to
remain rhetorical in nature. What are the pmposes of intercollegiate debate?
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AGNEW'S MEDIA SPEECHES: THE CREATION OF
A SCAPEGOAT
F. Michael Smith
The principle of " 'redemption' through victimage," according to Kenneth
Burke, characterizes "the great religious and theological doctrine that forms
the incunabula [origin] of our culture."^ This human need for a scapegoat
is exemplified in the concept of "catharsis" in Greek tragedy and in the
Christian doctrine of expiation of original sin through the Crucifixion which
stiU retains a seminal impact on the ordering of our Hves.^ "Burke believes
the feudal enactment of redemption through victimage to be one of the great
ritual dramas whose form stiU determines how we play our roles in society. ^
Our society is more secular than theological, however, so that our drama
of victimage is more likely to play in the political than the religious arena.
Burke recognizes this when he comments "Then are we, at this late date,
but rediscovering some possible Machiavellian uses of the scapegoat prin
ciple'!"^ The political strategy of creating scapegoats as a rhetorical foil has
been a technique long associated with Richard Nixon who has consistently
sought "to make war on something."® One of the more prolonged wars of
Nixon's career has been with the press and television reporters. In Nixon s
Administration this hostility has assumed a new dimension as Nixon and
his strategists, through the spokesmanship of Vice-President Agnew, at
tempted to make a scapegoat of the media not only for their pubhc relations
gaffes but also for the nation's unrest. Agnew's rhetorical strategies in
pursuing this mission are tlie subject of this study, focusing on his most
famous speeches: his criticism of the television news medium in a nationaUy
televised speech in Des Moines, Iowa on November 13, 1969® and his criti
cism of the New York Times and Washington Post one week later in Mont
gomery, Alabama.^
Rhetorical Background
The selection of the media as the object of Vice-President Agnew's wrath
lay partially in "the deep-seated suspicion of the press and hostility toward
F. Michael Smith (M.A., University of Georgia, 1970) is a Teaching Associate
and Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Speech and Theatre Arts, University of
Pittsburgh.
^ Keimeth Burke, Permanence and Change, Tlie Library of Liberal Arts (Indian
apolis: The Bobbs-MerriU Company, Inc., 1965), pp. 284-285. For an analysis of
the scapegoat principle applied to Nixon's attacks upon students see Rebecca Mowe,
"Student Dissidents: Strategic Role in Nixon's Consensus Style," Speaker and
Gavel, VIII (November, 1970), 8-12.
® Ibid., p. 285.
®Hu^ Dalziel Duncan, Communication and Social Order (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1962), p. 126.
^ Burke, Permanence and Change, p. 286.
® Lynn Hinds and Carolyn Smith, "Rhetoric of Opposites," Nation, February 16,
1970, p. 172.
® "The Responsibilities of Television," in Frankly Speaking: A Collection of
Extraordinary Speeches (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1970), pp. 62-72.
'' "The Power of The Press," ibid., pp. 78-85.
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it felt over the years by some key figures in the current Administration."®
Nixon, of course, after losing the 1962 California governor's race made his
famous statement to the press that "You won't have Nixon to kick around
any more."® But perhaps the most blatant admission of repressive intentions
toward the media was made in a private conversation by Frank Shakespeare,
Nixon's television advisor, when he admitted that he would like to warn NBC
that "you just might find yourself having a httle trouble getting some of
yom- licenses renewed" if Nixon was elected and felt that NBC had continued
its "biased" coverage of his campaign. This hostihty for the media was
translated through Agnew's attacks into a drama of both personal and public
pm-gation. The media functions as a personal scapegoat for Nixon and Agnew
because it is the channel through which they, as pubhc personages, interact
with their constituencies. A scapegoat by its very nature must bear a close
relationship with its attacker. Burke comments about the scapegoat that "it
is profoundly consubstantial with those who, . . . , would ritualistically
cleanse themselves by loading the burden of their own iniquities upon it."^^
For Nixon especially the press has "become the personification of aU the
frustrating forces that make the life of a president so difficult.''^^ Thus,
through victimage Nixon and his Administration are "purified" of their
mistakes which become the guilt of the media as communicator rather than
the Administration as actor.
While a scapegoat functions as a pm-gative for the individual, the sacri
ficing of a common scapegoat often serves as a bond of societal cohesion.
Burke questions "whether human societies could possibly cohere without
symbolic victims which the individual members of the group share in com
mon" and then he concludes that "here is the very centre of man's social
motivation."!® The promotion of social cohesion through the creation of a
common scapegoat appears to have been the central goal of Agnew's No
vember onslaught against the media. One strategy was the diversion of
public dissatisfaction from Nixon's increasingly unpopular handling of
Vietnam. Bernard L. Brock concluded "Mr. Agnew's speech counteracted
the criticisms of Mr. Nixon's Vietnam policy by questioning the credibility
of the TV news medium and by drawing attention away from Vietnam."!''
In this manner the media served as one of the Administration's "scapegoat
chimeras toward which a large number of American people can channel
their dissonant feelings."!® Another aspect of Agnew's depiction of the
media as inimical to the President and the pubhc was the sohdification of the
bond between many Americans and the Nixon Administration. Through the
sacrificing of a common enemy "We become comrades in ai'ms; our hatred
® "Beat the Press, Round Two," Newstveek, December 1, 1969, p. 26.
® Ibid.
!° Joe McGlnnls, The Selling of The President 196S (New York: Pocket Books,
1970), p. 56.
!!Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (Berkeley; University of California
Press, 1969), p. 406.
George E. Reedy, The Twilight of the Presidency (New York: The World
Publishing Company, 1970), p. 116.
Burke, Permanence and Change, p. 285.
" Bernard L. Brock, "Spiro Agnew's Diversionary Rhetoric," Speaker and Gavel
VII (March, 1970), 85.
Frank A. Venture, "The Nixon Administration: The Rhetoric of Confusion
and Illusion," Speaker and Gavel, VllI (January, 1971), 40.
11
et al.: Complete Issue 9(3)
Published by Cornerstone: A Collection of Scholarly and Creative Works for Minnesota State University, Mankato, 2018
78 SPEAKER AND GAVEL
of each other . . . heing purged in the sufferings of our enemy."^® Thus,
Nixon's "war" on the media was shared by the pubUc, converting at least
temporarily, public frustrations into identification with the Administration^'^
Agnew As High Priest
The sacrificing of a scapegoat requires a "high priest" to perform the
obsequies before the faithful. In the Nixon Administration this less-than-
dehcate task was allotted to Vice-President Agnew, thus keeping the Pres
ident seemingly above partisan politics. Agnew, in the words of Eugene
McCarthy, was acting as "Nixon's Nixon"^® and while the Admmistration at
first tried to conceal the origin of Agnew's rhetoric it was soon discovered
that White House speech writer Patrick Buchanan had composed both of
Agnew's November speeches denouncing the media.^®
Agnew's selection as "high priest" seemed dictated by his remarkable
affinity for the Administration's natural constituency of Middle America.
Agnew's relationship with the "Silent Majority" exemplifies both levels of
Kenneth Bmke's theory of "identification." First, Agnew's origins, life style
and beliefs are quintessentially Middle American. Stewart Alsop concluded
after an interview with Agnew that "his style of speech and thought precisely
mirrors the style of the 'Middle Americans' who make up the great majority
of the American electorate."®® This "consubstantiahty" with the middle class
is apparent in Agnew's rhetoric which impresses his audiences with his
"missionary zeal and a sense of genuine moral outrage."®^ Secondly, Ag
new's rhetorical style and the tone of his speeches provide a vicarious outlet
for the emotions of a frustrated populace by using the same highly charged
oratory so popular with the radical Left.®® The substance of Agnew's speeches
further enhances his identification with his intended audience. His subjects
have been those which preoccupy Middle America and his stands have been
calculated to please them. Cahfomia pollster Don Muchmore affirmed that
"What Agnew is telling the public is precisely what the man in the middle
has been saying to his neighbor for the last six months."®® A measure of
Agnew's effectiveness in identifying with the American middle class at this
time was the large amount of favorable mail he received. Through January,
1970, he had received 149,000 letters and telegrams with all but 10,000
approving of him and what he had been saying.®^ The high point of Agnew's
popularity and the speech which set the stage for his November criticisms
of the media was his blast at the anti-war movement in New Orleans on
October 19, 1969. Speaking of the October 15 Vietnam Moratorium, Agnew
delivered his most sensational line of the season: "A spirit of national mas-
" Duncan, Communication and Social Order, p. 132.
"Evaluating the immediate effect of Agnew's rhetoric. Time concluded: "For
the present, the AdriiinistratiOri seems to have gained points. It has stimulated
loyalist demonstrations in the streets and awakened latent doubts about the wisdom
and motives of those who criticize in print and on television." "The Administration
V. the Critics," Time, November 28, 1969, p. 20.
"Spiro Agnew: The King's Taster," Time, November 14, 1969, p. 17.
" "Beat The Press, Round Two," p. 25.
®® Stewart Alsop, "Spiro Speaks," Newsweek, November 3, 1969, p. 110.
"Spiro Agnew: The King's Taster," p. 17.
®® Ibid., p. 18.
Ibid.
John Osbome, "Agnew's Effect," New Republic, February 28, 1970, p. 14.
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ochism prevails, encoui'aged by an effete corps of impudent snobs who
characterize themselves as intellectuals."2® Reaction to that statement jumped
Agnew's mail from about 1,500 per week to over 5,500 with fewer than one-
fourth of the reactions critical of him.^® Thus, less than one month prior to
his critiques of the news media Spiro Agnew had managed to place himself
well in the public eye and attract a large and sympathetic national following.
This successful identification with millions of Americans was a key factor in
the execution of his strategies creating a national scapegoat of the media.
The Strategies of Scapegoating
Creating the scapegoat involves two stages; the identification of the victim
as the embodiment of evil and the "sacrificing" of the victim to achieve
purgation. Hugh Dalziel Duncan explains this duahsm:
When this struggle [redemption through victimage] is personified (and
it usually is), we have the hero and the villain, or, in common speech,
the "good guy" and the "bad guy". . . . The resolution of such struggles
is achieved through punishing the villain in the name of some great tran
scendent principle. Only then does the suffering and death of the sacrifi
cial victim purge us of guHt—^in literature, religion, and now, as we have
discovered to our horror, in the actualities of political life.^^
Agnew's media speeches of November 13 and 20 display both of these
identifying characteristics of the strategy of scapegoating.
One tactic Agnew employed was to assert that the TV news commentators
had violated that most revered American value—^fair play, by not listening
to President Nixon's November 3rd Vietnam speech with an open mind:
It was obvious that their minds were made up in advance. Those who
recall the fumbling and groping that followed President Johnson's dra
matic disclosure of his intention not to seek reelection have seen these men
in a genuine state of nonpreparedness. This was not it.^®
This same tactic was evident in Agnew's indictment of the New York Times
and Washington Post in Montgomery:
If a theology student in Iowa should get up at a PTA luncheon in
Sioux City and attack the President's Vietnam policy, my guess is that you
would probably find it reported somewhere the next morning in the New
York Times. But when 300 Congressmen endorse the President's Vietnam
policy, the next morning it is apparently not considered fit news to print.®
Another tactic Agnew utilized to pin the "bad guy" label on the newsmen
was his appeal to the emotional respect many Americans hold for the insti-
"Masochism Versus The Facts," in Frankly Speaking, p. 25.
^ John Osbome, "Spiro Agnew's Mission," New Republic, November 15, 1969,
p. 17.
Duncan, Communication and Social Order, p. 126.
"The Responsibilities of Television," p. 62.
^ "The Power of The Press," p. 81. The story about the 300 Congressmen and
59 Senators who signed a letter endorsing the President's Vietnam Policy missed
the first edition of the New York Times but made all the others. See 'The Weekly
Agnew Special," Time, November 28,1969, p. 62.
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tution of the Presidency.^" Anything but wholehearted support for the Presi
dent's policies was depicted as evil in itself regardless of the form, validity,
or sincerity of the objection:
One commentator twice contradicted the President's statement about the
exchange of correspondence with Ho Chi Minh. Another challenged the
President's abilities as a politician. A third asserted that the President
was now "following the Pentagon line." Others, by the expressions on
their faces, the tone of their questions and the sarcasm of their response,
made dear their sharp disapproval.®^
The character of the scapegoat achieved personification through Agnew's
verbal pillorying of Averell Hairiman. Governor Haniman was "trotted out,"
he "recited perfectly," and "offered a broad range of gratuitous advice."
Further, Governor Harriman violated the President's mythical immunity to
criticism by "challenging and contradicting the pohcies outlined by the
President of the United States.""^ Finally, Agnew symbohcally shifted the
blame for the nation's frustration over Vietnam onto Harriman:
A word about Mr. Harriman. For ten months he was America's chief
negotiator at the Paris Peace Talks—a period in which the United States
swapped some of the greatest military concessions in the history of war
fare for an enemy agreement on the shape of a bargaining table. Like
Coleridge's Ancient Mariner, Mr. Harriman seems to be under some heavy
compulsion to justify his failures to anyone who will listen.®®
The networks shared Haniman's guilt for they "have shown themselves
wiUing to give him aU the air time he desires."®^
Agnew also stigmatized the media as controlled by an undemocratic "tiny
fraternity" from the "Eastern Estabhshment" which is symbolic to many
Middle Americans of "glibness and superiority, of unwelcome change, of
dissent and division."®" In Des Moines Agnew charged:
We do know that, to a man, these commentators and producers live and
work in the geographical and intellectual confines of Washington, D.C. or
New York City—the latter of which James Reston terms the "most unrep
resentative community in the entire United States." Both communities
bask in their own provincialism, their own parochialism.®®
In Montgomery Agnew reinforced this theme by selectively attacking only
the New York Times and the Washington Post as undesirable monopohes
while ignoring the monopolistic tendencies of non-"EstabHshment" papers.®'^
Furthermore, Agnew imputed to this implicitly ehtist media responsibihty
for many of the problems which plague America and frighten Middle Amer-
®®For a discussion of how college texts glorify the Presidency see Thomas E.
Cronin, "Superman, Our Textbook President," Washington Monthly, October, 1970,
pp. 47-^4.
31 "TJie Responsibilities of Television," pp. 62-63.
®® Ibid., p. 63.
®® Ibid.
^^Ihid.
®® "Agnew Demands Equal Time," Time, November 21, 1969, p. 18.
®® "The Responsibilities of Television," p. 66.
Marvin Barrett, ed.. Survey of Broadcast Journalism 1969-1970: Year of Chal
lenge, Year of Crisis (New York: Crosset & Dunlap, Inc., 1970), pp. 39-40.
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ica in particular. Not only did Agnew claim tliat "a narrow and distorted
picture of America often emerges from the televised news,"®® he suggested
that the news media was a root cause of protest by disaffected groups:
"How many marches and demonstrations would we have if the marchers did
not know that the ever-faithful TV cameras would be there to record their
antics for the next news show?"®® Thus, Agnew transformed the media from
an observer and reporter of a troubled America into a "scapegoat" funda
mentally responsible for our national unrest.
Agnew's symbohc "sacrificing" of the media scapegoat came with his calls
for overt public pressure. In his nationally televised speech in Des Moines
Agnew exhorted:
The people can let the networks know that they want their news straight
and objective. The people can register their complaints on bias through
mail to the networks and phone calls to local stations. This is one case
where the people must defend themselves; where the citizen—^not govern
ment—^must be the reformer; where the consumer can be the most effective
crusader.^"
In Montgomery Agnew's language was less blatant but the message was the
same: "The day when the network commentators and even gentlemen of
the New York Times enjoyed a form of diplomatic immunity from comment
and criticism of what they said—that day is past."^^ Agnew's calls did not go
unheeded. When the three networks had counted all the telegrams, phone
calls and letters prompted by Agnew's media speeches there were over
150,000 with the score about two-to-one in favor of Agnew. Also, Agnew's
office reported receiving 73,938 favorable letters to only 3,784 unfavorable^®
and a poll conducted by ABC indicated that fifty-one percent agreed with
Agnew's statement that TV news was presented in a biased manner.^® How
ever, Agnew's success in making a national scapegoat of the news media is
most starkly demonstrated by the natm'e of the "hate mail" the media re-
eeived which Alfred Balk described as "the heaviest shower of hate com
munications since the McCarthy era."^^ Altogether, the three networks
received 2,500 pieces of hate mail of which ten percent was anti-black; eleven
percent was anti-Semitic; and twenty-five percent "accused the networks
of some sort of communist affiliation or sympathy."^® Blacks, Jews and
"Communists" are, of course, the standard scapegoats of contemporary
America. The intensity of hostdity toward the media generated by Agnew's
rhetoric is further indicated by the fifteen percent of the networks' mail which
included some sort of threat ranging from writing the FCC to phrases like
"maybe you need a bombing."''® It appears that the media made a readily
acceptable victim for a substantial portion of Agnew's audience.
38 "pjie Responsibilities of Television," p. 70.
Ibid., p. 71.
^ "The Responsibilities of Television," pp. 71-72.
"The Power of The Press," p. 85.
Barrett, ed.. Survey of Broadcast Journalism 1969-1970, p. 32.
^ Ibid., p. 33.
^ Alfred BaUc, "Beyond Agnewism," Columbia Journalism Review, Winter 1969-
1970, p. 14.
Barrett, ed.. Survey of Broadcast Journalism 1969—1970, p. 33.
^ Ibid.
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Conclusion
While the critiques of Agnew's media speeches of November, 1969, de
plored his tactics of misrepresentation and his call for public retribution,
they seem to have ignored the most significant rhetorical implications. Ag
new's assaults on the news media were of a uniquely rhetorical nature with
rhetorical consequences. Government has long been criticizing TV and the
press along the lines of Agnew's claims without causing the hue and cry
Agnew occasioned, and even the TV news medium, supposedly sensitive,
about Federal hcensing, has no qualms about ignoring a Congressional
subpoena.'^'' What caused the Columbia University Survey of Broadcast
Journalism to cite Agnew's Des Moines speech as "the year's most significant
event"^® for broadcast journalism was not the implied threat of subpoenas or
license revocations, but Agnew's sucess in making a popular scapegoat of the
media and what this portends. For Agnew and the Nixon Administration the
media represented only one of many scapegoats conveniently utflized for
political ends. However, the possibihty that the Administration's habit of
blithely creating scapegoats whenever pohtically advantageous might ignite
soeiety's need for a "total" victim in the mold of Hitler's Germany or even Joe
McCarthy's "Communists" clearly demands that rhetorical critics unmask
even these attempts at "fragmented victimage."
"Stanton's No," Time, July 5, 1971, p. 68.
Barrett, ed., p. 31.
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SAFEGUARD ABA1, DETERRENT OR DECEPTION?:
A STUDY ON THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN MODERN
DELIBERATIVE ADVOCACY
Ray Lynn Andehson
On March 14, 1969, President Nixon announced his Safeguard program,^
an Anti-Ballistic Missile system designed primarily to protect missiles, not
people. This proposal, while dismantling the Sentinel system and thereby
ending the city-dweUers' opposition to ABM, nonetheless opened up a search
ing inquiry into U.S. nuclear policy. The Safeguard debate forcibly reminded
us that the control of annaments is clearly the most important political
question in the modem world, for the arms race literally devours our resources
and influences all other questions of poverty, jobs and housing, both at home
and abroad. The argument over Safeguard reminded us too that
Very few people in this country, or even in the world, have the sclen-
tlfie and technical competence to pass judgment on whether this missile
would be effective in knocking down multiple-entry warheads with their
decoys and other radar scramblers; or even whether deploying such a
system, whatever its cost, would add to or subtract from the security of
the Republic.^
In this situation, where the stakes are enormous, the issues complex, secrecy
necessary and expertise essential, about all the rhetorical critic can demand
is not a specific decision but what James Reston calls "a sense of confidence
in the process of decision" and in the publie debate that is its suasory eormter-
part.®
My objective in the following pages, then, is to gauge how mueh we may
rightfully have a sense of confidence in the process of decision conceming
the Safeguard program, and to determine that confidence level by illustrating
where Administration rhetoric on ABM has involved major instances of de
ception rather than viable argument over the nature of a deterrent. Because
space is limited, I shall not deal with Administration argument on the ques
tions of American-Soviet missile strength, the implications of ABM on lie
SALT Talks, and Safeguard's likely costs. Instead, I shall coneentrate on the
credibility of Government argument touehing the basic issue of workability;
i.e., argument pertaining to the scientific-technical aspects of the Safeguard
program. Hopefully, such an inquiry will more clearly explicate the impor
tance of the role that science (and scientists) plays in modem deliberative
advocacy.
Ray Lynn Anderson is Assistant Professor of Rhetoric at the University of Pitts
burgh. This essay is an enlarged version of a paper presented at the December,
1970 Speech-Communication Association Convention in New Orleans.
^ For texts of President Nixon's news conference, see the New York Times, March
15, 1969, p. 17, and the Department of State pamphlet "The Anti-Ballistic Missile
System," Released April, 1969, Publication 8449, General Foreign Pohcy Series 231.
^ James Reston, "ABM—^Administration's Biggest Mistake?", the New York
Times, March 12, 1969, p. 40M.
® Ibid.
17
et al.: Complete Issue 9(3)
Published by Cornerstone: A Collection of Scholarly and Creative Works for Minnesota State University, Mankato, 2018
84 SPEAKER AND GAVEL
On December 3, 1968, from his pre-inaugural headquarters in New York's
Pierre Hotel, President-elect Richard M. Nixon announced to the press his
appointment of Lee Alvin DuBridge as the next science adviser to the White
House. Professor DuBridge was selected, said the President-elect, chiefly
because through him the Nixon Administration would best "he able to reas
sure the scientific community that our interest in them is not simply what
they can produce hut also how they can counsel us."^
Since Safeguard was the Nixon Administration's first major program to he
tested in the process of Congressional argument, it also represented the first
practical occasion for the Administration to reassure the scientific estahhsh-
ment that interest in them went beyond simple productivity and extended to
the seeking out of counsel on technical-political matters. Moreover, members
of both the Administration and the scientific community realized that past
dehberations on ABM, on Sentinel in particular, had not involved any honest
attempt to obtain the counsel of a fair sample of competent scientists. In
deed, the Sentinel dehberations were characterized primarily by the unrelent
ing attempt by the Government to operate independently of the advice of the
scientific community at large. And this independence, this persistence in
ignoring expert opinion of divergent types, was strategic: a "poHcy" care
fully outlined in the now fairly well-known memorandum of September 30,
1968, from Secretary of tlie Army Stanley B. Besor to then Secretary of
Defense Clark Clifford. The Besor Memo suggested a "public information"
or propaganda effort in behalf of ABM.
Several highly placed and reputable U.S. scientists have spoken out in
print against the Sentinel missile system.
Although it is difficult because of security aspects to answer the techni
cal arguments used by these men against Sentinel, it is essential that aU
possible questions raised by these opponents be answered, preferably by
non-govermnent scientists.
We will be in contact shortly with scientists who are familiar with the
Sentinel program and who may see fit to write articles for publication
supporting the technical feasibility and operational effectiveness of the
Sentinel system.
We shall extend to these scientists aU practical assistance.®
The public relations campaign suggested by Besor and carried out by the
Defense Department did not result in any impressive pro-Sentinel publica
tions. It did, however, register a considerable impact on the Congressional
discussions on ABM. That is to say, the Administration had, as Senator
J. William Fulbright noted in a special, secret session of the Senate on 2 Oc
tober 1968, loaded the witness roster so that when the Senate discussed the
technical aspects of Sentinel "no witnesses were brought into the hearings
.  . . except Administration witnesses."® So badly biased were the Sentinel
* Quoted in "Mr. Nixon and the New Era of Science," Saturday Review, LII
(January 4,1969), 101.
® These parts of the Resor Memorandum were printed in Phfhp Geyehn's article
"U.S. Bid to 'Sell' ABM Told," the Washington Post, February 16, 1969, p. 1.
® The Congressional Record, November 1, 1968, E9642. This version of this
closed debate, while being quietly slipped into the Record, probably by Senator
John Sherman Cooper), was censored by the Department of Defense. Also see
Bryce Nelson, "ABM: Senators Request Outside Scientific Advice in Closed Ses
sion," Science, Vol. 162 (December 20, 1968), 1374—1375.
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hearings that in the October closed session we find Senator Pastore attempt
ing to defend Dr. Edward Teller, for the last decade the prime example of a
"stooge expert" for the Pentagon, as "an outside scientist.'"^ We also observe
Senator Russell attempting to portray Dr. John Foster as lacking self-interest,
even though Foster is head of all scientific work in the Department of
Defense.®
That the Nixon Administration decided to employ the rhetorical philosophy
of the Resor Memo—to 'sell' ABM by countering or silencing the scientific
opposition to it—is supported by ample evidence. According to Science
magazine, for example, the most probable rationale for the shift from city
defense (Sentinel) to missile defense (Safeguard) was neither for technical
or security reasons but rather to blunt the criticisms of a well-organized
majority of independent scientists.® Then, too, the thrust of Administration
rhetoric on the workability of Safeguard has been to create the illusion of
"consensus," the behef that the project has the nearly unanimous endorsement
of American men of science. For instance, in addressing 970 members and
guests of San Francisco's Commonwealth Club of California at the Sheraton-
Palace Hotel on May 7, 1969, Spiro Agnew declared that "I am convinced it
will work," and so is "a responsible majority" of scientists.i® Another ABM
spokesman, Eugene P. Wigner, Nobel prize-winning physicist at Princeton
University, has on various occasions quite falsely suggested that those
scientists opposing Safeguard represent a tiny minority of hberal, Boston-
based academics—a group led primarily by Jerome Wiesner, science ad
viser to President Kennedy, and now Provost of the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology.^i
But most of the distortion and deception in Administration argument on
the hkely workabihty of ABM has been exposed in a post facto fashion. Ex
emplary of such exposure was when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
caught the Defense Department in a red-handed attempt to depict substantial
consensus among scientists concerning the decision to proceed with Safe
guard.
In response to committee inquiries on what outside experts were con
sulted by the Pentagon in reaching tlie Safeguard decision, the Pentagon
suliedpp [supplied] a list of 21 members of the President's Science Advisory
Committee who it said were 'repsent [present] at discussion of ABM with
Dr. John S. Foster Jr., director of defense research and engineering.
In a footnote of the hearing record, the committee noted, 'This meeting
was held on March 17 and 18, although tire decision to proceed with Safe
guard was announced on March 14.'^^
On March 31, 1969, Herbert A. York (former Dhector of defense research
and engineering) and K. H. Panofsky (Stanford University's radar expert)
announced that they had been the victims of additional Government decep
tion on Safeguard. Both men were rightfully outraged when David Packard,
^ The Congressional Record, E9643.
® Ibid.
® "ABM: Scientists' Loyal Opposition Finds a Forum," Science, Vol. 163 (March
21, 1969), 1309.
Quoted in the New York Times, May 8, 1969, p. 19C.
A Complete Transcript of National Educational Televisions "The ABM Ques
tion," 8:00 PM, EST, Friday, March 14, 23-25.
The New York Times, April 24, 1969, p. 20C.
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Deputy Secretary of Defense, had inaccmately stated their positions on
Safeguard before the Senate Disarmament Subcommittee. Panofsky was
claimed to be a supporter of ABM and to have been involved in consultation
with the Pentagon on the project. Both of these claims were false. York's
irritation stemmed from Packard's portrayal of him as a zany, unfit to be
listened to on ABM because "He is the one who did not think the Polaris
would work."!^ The false and irresponsible nature of this attack on Professor
York caused much indignation among members of the scientific community,
especially James R. KiUian (President Eisenhower's science adviser) who en
couraged York to protest publicly and correct the Packard testimony to the
Senate subcommittee.^^
Yet just one year later two more resepected American scientists found
themselves publicly repudiating Pentagon claims that they in fact supported
Safeguard as technically feasible. These men, Sidney D. Drell of Stanford's
Linear Accelerator Center and M. L. Goldberger of Princeton's physics fac
ulty, were depicted by John S. Foster as saying that the Safeguard "would
do the job the Department of Defense wants to do."^® But again, Drell and
Goldberger's only recourse was to announce that they had never offered
technical support of any ABM system and to appear in their own behalf
before the Anns Control Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Com
mittee.^®
The foregoing analysis suggests, of course, that not only did the Nixon
Administration attempt to institute a weapons system with little technical
backing but it also set into motion a propaganda effort in behaK of Safeguard
to imply that the project had the almost full support of the scientific estab-
hshment. The significance of these Administration deceptions cannot be
completely appreciated, however, apart from an understanding of the sub
stantial consequences they ended up generating for the overall congressional
debate on Safeguard.
Perhaps the most obvious of these consequences was the quite unprece
dented power struggle that developed between the Senate's Armed Services
Committee and Foreign Relations Committee. Because J. W. Fulbright,
Mike Mansfield, Stuart Symington, Albert Gore, George Aiken, Clifford Case
and John Sherman Cooper felt that the Armed Services Committee had given
the entire technical side of Safeguard a biased and superficial analysis, it
was decided that the Foreign Relations Committee should move, without
any hesitation, into the militaiy domain. Washington pohtical observer John
W. Finney stated that
Perhaps because it has become so entrenehed in power, the Armed
Services Committee gave up doing its homework and began relying too
much on the word of the Pentagon. That is one reason the ABM opposi
tion has been able to seize the initiative. Some members of the Foreign
Relations Committee have been doing their homework—^in seminars with
scientists as weE as pubEc hearings by the Disarmament Subcommittee.
As a result they have been able to raise technical questions that senior
The New York Times, April 1, 1969, p. 1.
Ibid., p. 9.
The Washington Post, June 27,1970, p. A4.
^^Ihid. For a decent account of the actual "consensus" of scientists on ABM,
read "ABM Decision: Coming to a Head," Science News, Vol. 95 (March 22,
1969), 280-281.
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members of the Armed Services Committee do not understand, much less
know the answers to.^''
Although we now see that the Armed Services Committee generally survived
the attacks ABM opponents made on its power base, it is stiU true that
because of these challenges "the Senate military estabhshment will not be
quite the same, quite so aU powerful."^® It is imlikely too that future Senate
debates on questions of weaponry will be so dominated by what has too
often been the one-sided view of a single committee.
The second major consequence of the Nixon Administration's deceptive
rhetoric on Safeguard's workability was to increase anti-ABM scientists' desire
to enter the public debate on Safeguard. Being excluded from the standard
advisory apparatus, and thus the normal channels of congressional decision-
making, scientists against ABM began forming citizen-action groups to lobby
in Washington and influence public opinion around the cormtry. And it is
here, in the area of ABM's public debate, that we confront the scientist qua
citizen as a fuUy capable, and unrelenting, advocate; a persuader utilizing a
wide variety of message styles and media types. For example, one antimissile
lobby, the Cormcil for a Livable World, arranged "chaUc-talks" on Safeguard's
technical problems for almost 50 Senatorial aides, with such leading scientists
as Jerome Wiesner, George W. Rathjens, and Herbert York participating.^®
Another group, Computer Professionals Against ABM, gave news conferences
against Safeguard, maintaining that "Our experience with large scale com
puter systems convinces us that such a pattern of development is highly
unlikely to lead to a successful computer system."®® Physicists Against ABM,
an organization that propagandized against Safeguard at the spring, 1969,
meeting of the American Physical Society in Washington, D. C., produced
demonstrations outside the White House, member scientists carrying placards
reading "Stop ABM."®i The Union of Concerned Scientists, composed
largely of Harvai'd and M.I.T. physicists and chemists, produced and dis
tributed an excellent pamphlet, "ABM/ABC," a compact document both
describing the essential features of Safeguard and then, in point-by-point
fashion, treating and refuting major Administration arguments in behalf of
the system.®® Then too, Administration attempts to keep anti-ABM scientists
out of the advisory network in Congi'ess seem to have stimulated individual
effort among certain scientists. We find, for instance, Jerome Wiesner
writing letters to editors of newspapers, giving speeches, and debating Safe
guard with Dr. Edward Teller in the U.S. News ir World Report?^ Herbert
York we observe engaging in the quite uncharacteristic activity of debating
Safeguard before a national television audience on "CBS REPORTS," April
29, 1969.®^ But by far the most impressive individual effort was that made
by Dr. Ernest J. Stemglass of the University of Pittsburgh. Indeed, when
The New York Times, March 30, 1969, p. 2E.
^nbid.
The New York Times, July 9, 1969, p. IC.
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, July 1, 1969, p. 6.
The New York Times, May 4,1969, HE.
"ABM/ABC." This pamphlet is published as a pubhc service by the Union of
Concemed Scientists, April 15, 1969, at Cambridge, Massachusetts.
U.S. News ir World Report, May 26, 1969, pp. 87-90.
Besides Professor York, also debating Safeguard on this episode of "CBS
REPORTS" were Lt. Gen. Alfred Starbird, John Foster.
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one considers that Stemglass has given hundreds of speeches opposing Safe
guard, written articles for Esquire, the New Scientist, as well as for the New
York Times and Pittsburgh's quasi-underground newssheet The Relative
Truth, and has appeared on American, British, and Canadian prime-time TV
productions, it is obvious that one is witnessing a one-man persuasive cam
paign.
But the thhd, and perhaps tlie most significant, result of the Administra
tion's attempts at portraying Safeguard as immaculate technically was to
shift both the communication forms and media utilized in the scientific-
political discussion of ABM. Instead of addressing Senate investigating com
mittees, and thereby reinforeing the oral tradition of the "expert" adviser,
anti-Safeguard seientists formd themselves providing their "expert" testimony
in the form of quasi-popular essays—articles stapled together in books by
publishing firms hoping, because of the interest in the ABM debate, to make
a quick profit.^® This "book debate" on Safeguard's workability actually had
its beginnings on February 19, 1969 when Senator Edward M. Kermedy,
believing that the Administration had been trying to do a scientific whitewash
job on ABM, announced on the Senate floor that he had commissioned Jerome
Wiesner and Professor Abram Chayes of Harvard to prepare a "non-Pentagon
report for the Senate on the issue."^'' This report, 344 pages long and entitled
"An Evaluation of the Decision to Deploy an Antibalhstic Missile System,"
was made public on May 5, 1969. Its central conclusion, according to Ken
nedy, was that the ABM system proposed by the Nixon Administration
"cannot perform effeetively the missions suggested for it."^® On May 6,1969,
copies of the report were distributed to all members of the Senate, to the
White House, the State Department and the Defense Department.
The Pentagon response to the Kennedy "Evaluation" was immediate. For
on May 6, a 64-page study prepared for the American Secmity Council and
■wiltten by Dr. Wdlard F. Libby (former AEC member and Nobel Prize-
winning chemist), Dr. Wdham J. Thaler (of Georgetown University's physics
department), and retired Gen. Nathan F. Twining, was also revealed to the
press. This report maintained that an "Anti-missile defense is an essential
component in the network of military systems designed to give . . . a seamless
garment of security in an age of acute danger."^® "Safeguard wiU 'work' in
the sense it is intended to work."®® In addition to the strategic release of this
document, John Foster promptly retaliated for the Pentagon with news clips
that depicted the Kennedy "Evaluation" as unscientific, incomplete, based on
faulty intelligence data, and replete with errors in its assumptions and con-
clusions.®!
In early May of 1969, Kennedy announced that two major pubhshing
Perhaps the most revealing materials relating to Stemglass' activities as a
public persuader are Philip M. Boffey, "Emest J. Stemglass: Controversial Prophet
of Doom," Science, Vol. 166 (October 10, 1969), 195-199, and Stemglass' article
"The Death of All Children," Esquire, hXXl (September 1969), la-Id.
The following discussion of the ABM "book debate" does not include Eugene
Rabinowitch and Ruth Adams (eds.). Debate the Antihallistic Missile (Chicago:
Published by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 1968).
The New York Times, May 7, 1969, p. 16C.
Pittsburgh Fost-Gazette, May 7, 1969, p. 6.
2" Ibid.
Ibid.
The New York Times, May 7,1969, p. 16C.
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houses (Harper & Row and the New American Library) had decided to
print his Senate report under the title of ABM: An Evaluation of the Deci
sion to Deploy an Antiballistic Missile System. Yet by Jime the Administra
tion supporters had already made then- counter move with the pubhcation
of their own book on Safeguard's technical feasibility, Why ABM? This book,
according to Herman Kahn, dhector of the Hudson Institute, who wrote two
of its chapters, was designed as a response to the Kennedy book and as an
attempt to "redress what has become a rather one-sided public discussion"
over Safeguard.®^ In rebuttal to Why ABM?, Kennedy charged on the Senate
floor and to the press that because the Hudson Institute was already rmder
contract on Safeguard (a $70,253 contract) there was a clear conflict of
interest, and that there was reason to believe the entire book was in fact
financed by the Department of Defense.®®
On August 4, 1969, Hawthorne Books, Inc. (the President of which is
millionaire W. Clement Stone, an avid Nixon supporter)®^ placed on the
market another pro-missile book. This volume. Safeguard: Why the ABM
Makes Sense, looked much like those that had preceded it; i.e., it was no
more than a collection of articles by scientists, politicians, and professional
political analysts, with an introduction by a well-known, and thus attention-
getting, politician. And the sales of this book were much hke those generated
by yet another book generally unfavorable to the Administration's Safeguard
proposal, ABM, Yes or No?^^ Both books sold about 15,000 copies. By far
the most successful volume in terms of total readership, however, was the
Kennedy report. According to Jay Iselin, vice-president of Harper & Row,
ABM had gone in only one month into a second hardcover edition and the
New American Library had published a paperback edition of 150,000
copies.®®
As we review the Safeguard debate, therefore, we note that (1) the Nixon
Administration recognized that the crucial issue was likely to be that of work
ability; that (2) in their preparation of rhetorical strategy Administration
advocates decided to develop a rhetoric of concealment, a rhetoric which
depicted Safeguard as technically unchallenged by the scientific community;
that (3) the deceptions that came out of this rhetorical stance ultimately
resulted in a congressional power struggle, a more hvely and infoiTnative
public debate on Safeguard, with scientists playing a major role in that
debate, and finally, the transformation of the normal exchange of expert
The New York Times, July 7, 1969, p. 1. Also, on the details of how the
various publishing houses came to be interested in the Kennedy "Evaluation," see
the New York Times, May 9, 1969, p. 40.
®® The New York Times, July 8, 1969, p. 130.
The New York Times, July 11, 1969, p. 50.
Ibid.
Ibid. For persons interested in the details of the argument transpiring in these
books, read Abram Ohayes and Jerome B. Wiesner (eds.), ABM: An Evaluation of
the Decision to Deploy an Antiballistic Missile System (New York: The New Amer
ican Library, 1969); Anti-Ballistic Missile: Yes or No?: A Special Report From
the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, with Introduction by Hubert H.
Humphrey (New York: Hill & Wang, 1969); Johan J. Hoist and WiUiam Schneider
Jr. (eds.). Why ABM?: Policy Issues in the Missile Defense Controversy (New
York: Pergamon Press, 1969); William R. Kintner (ed.). Safeguard: Why the
ABM Makes Sense (New York: Hawthorn Books, Inc., 1969).
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opinion, being excluded from the congressional scene, into the form of a
"book debate."
Yet there is still another lesson offered by the Safeguard debate. For Ad
ministration rhetoric on ABM requires us to rethink the whole issue of the
separation of politics and science. It is an issue raised with exceptional poign
ancy by the Administration's mid-April, 1969, decision not to appoint Dr.
Franklin Long of Cornell as director of the National Science Foundation.
Long, a physical chemist of considerable repute with an impressive history of
Government service, found that his impending appointment was at the
eleventh-hour withdrawn because (according to versions of the story by
Dr. DuBridge, Rep. Emiho Q. Daddario, and Dr. Long himself) he would
not agree to shift his technical position and support the Administration's
Safeguard system.®^
The reaction to this move within the scientific community was profound.
Indeed, many conservative scientific bodies, including the National Science
Board and the Federation of American Societies for Experimental Biology,^®
immediately went on record as deploring the Long episode as a case of
political "arm-twisting," an action that placed the "National Science Founda
tion in the political arena where science does not properly belong."®^
On April 29, 1969, a mere two weeks after the Long episode, another
Administration advocate. House Republican leader Gerald R. Ford, publicly
suggested that there might be a dark cabal of scientific opponents to ABM
conspiring to deliver the United States defenseless to its enemies through
what he called "unilateral disarmament."'"'
This charge, which came while the American Physical Society was meet
ing in Washington, was heard with dismay and anger by many of the
assembled scientists.
What angered many physicists was what they took to be an imphed
connection between ABM opposition and treason.^'^
The injection of the patriotism issue into what ought to be reasoned scien-
tific-pohtical discourse over matters of national concern is indeed disquieting.
Unsettling too is the Government attempt to tamper with NSF policy and
personnel—^for, with its annual budget of $500 million, the National Science
Foundation determines, more than any other organization, the present wel
fare and future potentiality of scientific research in America.
But the truly disheartening thing about the Safeguard debate, at least for
the rhetorician, is that it illustrates that in a society so heavily dependent
upon technical knowledge, we live with a political system which, while osten
sibly seeking the advice of the scientific intelligentsia on questions of public
interest, is nonetheless willing to initiate propaganda campaigns for programs
The New York Times, April 17, 1969, p. 1; April 22, 1969, p. 13C; May 8,
1969, p. 230. Also see "ABM and NSF," Science News, Vol. 95 (May 3, 1969),
421-422.
The New York Times, April 19,1969, p. 150.
^nbid.
Pittsburgh Press, May 24, 1969, p. 12.
Ibid. For an understanding of the consequences of the Nixon Administration's
actions on the scientific establishment, read James W. Brarm's "Individual Rule
Within Science Seen at an End," The Chronicle of Higher Education, January 13,
1969, p. 1; Daniel S. Greenberg, "Science under Nixon: Influence Has Declined in
National Affairs," Science, Vol. 169 (September 11, 1970), 1056-1057.
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which, from the best available evidence, have very little lilcelihood of working
effectively. And it is, I submit, precisely this tension between the need for
technical advice and the self-serving, propagandistic orientation of Big Gov
ernment that has given the American people the SST, the Fill, and count
less other complicated and expensive weapons systems that consistently fail
to do the jobs they were alleged to he able to do. 1 conclude, then, with the
simple injunction that if, as we have been told, science is too important to be




Twenty essays which appeared in the Cmrent Criticism department
of Speaker and Gavel between 1966 and 1970 have been reprinted as
a paperback book by Delta Sigma Rho-Tau Kappa Alpha.
These studies provide a lively panorama of the significant themes
to which contemporaiy speakers address themselves. The agonies of
the Vietnam decisions and the emergence of the 'Tjlack power" issue
strikingly dominate the concerns of speakers and critics alike, but
other issues as well are given rhetorical analysis in this volume.
Copies of Current Criticism may be obtained for $2.50 from
Theodore Walwik, National Secretaiy, DSR-TKA, Shppery Rock
State College, Slippery Rock, Penna. 16057. They are also available
from the Speech Communication Association, Statler Hilton Hotel,
New York, N.Y. 10001.
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REGION IV TOURNAMENT
Twenty-eight two-man teams from eighteen DSR-TKA affihated colleges
and universities competed in the Region IV tomnament hosted by the Uni
versity of Alabama November 18-20. Samford University posted a 13-3
record to capture the Governor's Trophy awarded for the best performance
by two teams from the same school. The University of Tennessee placed the
top speaker, Bill Haltom, and the top two-man team, defeating Samford
in the final round.
Re-elected Regional Governor was Dr. Joseph G. Weatherby of Duke Uni
versity. Dr. Robert Pruett, University of Georgia, was elected Vice-Govemor
and Mrs. Norma Gook, University of Tennessee, was elected Secretary. The
student chapter elected; John Bertolotti, University of Alabama—^President;
Frank England, University of Tennessee—Vice-President; Ann Gruber, Wake
Forest University—Secretary.
Dr. Merrill G. Ghristophersen, retiring Director of Forensics at the Univer
sity of South Garolina, was honored by the Alabama Ghapter at the faculty
diimer and by the student membership at the annual business meeting of
Region IV.






Dr. Joseph Weatherby (right). Governor of Region IV, presents the Governor's
Trophy to Brad Bishop, Director of Forensics ot Samford University, for best
performance by two teams from the same school at the regional debate tournament,
November 18—20.
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REGION V TOURNAMENT
The Miami University chapter hosted the Midwestern DSR-TKA Regional
Championship on Januaiy 28—29. Toledo University dominated the tourna
ment, winning both the 4-man championship and the special televised final
round. Toledo defeated Indiana University in the final round.
In other Region II activity, a mail ballot has resulted in the election of
Robert Friedenberg of Miami University as the new Regional Governor,
replacing Tom Ludlum.
REGION VII TOURNAMENT
Twelve DSR-TKA schools participated in Wichita's annual tourney. The
University of Kansas dominated the competition among these chapters. Kan
sas captured first and second in the Senior division and first in the Junior
division. The sweepstakes winners were as follows: (1) University of Kan
sas, (2) Southern Methodist, and (3) Texas Tech.
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... Jerome B. Polisky
Frank B. Smith
. David W. Shepard
Thomas Moser
Margaret D. McCoy
... Robert A. Dayton
C. F. Evans, Jr.
Roger E. Soppington





California State, Long Beach, Calif
Capitol, Columbus, Ohio
Corlow, Pittsburgh, Pa.
Case-Western Reserve, Cieveland, Ohio
Chicago, Chicago, III.
Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio
Clemson, Clemson, S. Carolina
Colgate, Hamilton, N.Y.
Colorado, Boulder, Colo.
Colorado College, Colorado Springs, Colo.
Connecticut, Storrs, Conn.
Cornell, Ithaca, N.Y
Cornell College, Mt. Vernon, Iowa
Creighton, Omaha, Nebraska









Eastern Kentucky State, Richmond, Ky.
Elizabethtown, Elizobethtown, Pa.
Emerson, Boston, Moss.
Emory ond Henry, Emory, Vo.
Emory, Atlanta, Ga.
Evansville, Evansviile, Ind.
Fairmont State College, Fairmont, W. Vo.
Florida, Gainesville, Fla.










. James A. Johnson
Joseph Seocrist
Arthur W. Rovine
.. Walter F. Stromer
Rev. H. J. McAuliffe, S.J.
Arthur N. Kruger
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Chapter Name, Address
George Washington, Washington, D.C.
Georgia, Athens, Georgia
Grinnell College, Grinnell, Iowa
Hamilton, Clinton, N.Y.
Hampden-Sydney, Hampden-Sydney, Va.




Hiram, Hiram, Ohio .




Indiana State, Terre Haute, Ind. .
Iowa State, Ames, Iowa
Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa
John Carroll, Cleveland, Ohio
Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas
Kansas State, Manhattan, Kansas
Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky
Kings, Wilkes Barre, Pa.
Knox, Galesburg, III.
Lehigh, Bethlehem, Pa.
Lincoln Memorial, Harrogate, Tenn.
Louisiana State, Baton Rouge, La.
Loyala, Baltimore, Md.
Loyola, Chicago, III.
Madison College, Horrisonburg, Vo. .
Manchester, North Manchester, Ind.
Mankato, Mankato, Minnesota
Marquette, Milwaukee, Wisconsin
Maryland, College Park, Maryland _
Massachusetts, Amherst, Mass.
Memphis State, Memphis, Tenn
Mercer, Macon, Georgia
Miami, Coral Gables, Fla.
Miami, Oxford, Ohio
Miami, Middleton, Ohio
Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan
Michigan State, East Lansing, Michigan
Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota
Missouri, Columbia, Missouri
Morgan State, Baltimore, Md.
Murray State, Murray, Kentucky
Muskingum, New Concard, Ohio
Nebraska, Lincoln, Nebraska
Nevada, Reno, Nevada
New Hampshire, Durham, N.H
New Mexico, Albuquerque, N.M
New Mexico Highlands, Las Vegas, N.M. !_
New Yark, (University Heights) New York, N.Y.
Faculty Sponsor
George F. Henigon, Jr.






































... C. William Colburn




... James Albert Tracy
— Judson D. Ellertson
Donald 0. Olson
Robert S. Griffin
— William O. Gilsdorf
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Chapter Name, Address Faculty Sponsor
New York, (Wash. Sq.) New York, N.Y. David Leahy
North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina Bert F. Bradley
North Dakota, Grand Forks, N.D. Wnn. Semlock and Bernard Brommel
Northern Iowa, Cedar Falls, Iowa Lillian R. Wagner
Northwestern, Evonston, III. David Zarefsky
Notre Dame, Notre Dome, Ind. Leonard Sommer
Oberiin, Oberlin, Ohio Daniel J. Goulding
Occidental, Los Angeles, Col Gory K. Paben
Ohio, Athens, Ohio Ted J. Foster
Ohio State, Columbus, Ohio Don Stanton
Ohio Wesleyan, Delaware, Ohio Ed Robinson
Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma Paul Barefield
Oregon, Eugene, Ore. C. Richard Keil
Oregon State, Corvallis, Oregon Thurston E. Doler
Pace, New York, N.Y. Frank Colbourne
Pacific, Forest Grove, Oregon Albert C. Hingston
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa. Stephen Miller
Pennsylvania State, University Park, Pa. Clayton H. Schug
Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa. Thomas Kane
Purdue, Lafayette, Indiana Henry L. Ewbank
Queens College, Flushing, N.Y. Howard I. Streifford
Randolph-Macon, Ashiand, Va. Edgar E. MacDonald
Rhode Island, Kingston, R.I Richard W. Roth
Richmond, Richmond, Va Max Graeber
Roonoke, Salem, Va. William R. Coulter
Rochester Institute of Technology, Rochester, N.Y. Joseph Fitzpatrick
Rollins, Winter Pork, Flo. Dean F. Graunke
Rutgers, New Brunswick, N.J. H. James Godwin
St. Anselm's, Manchester, N.H. John A. Lynch
St. Cioud State, St. Cloud, Minn. William R. McCleary
St. John's University, Jamaica, N.Y. James Hall
St. Lawrence, Canton, N.Y. Joan O. Donovan
Samford University, Birmingham, Ala Brad Bishop
Son Francisco State, San Francisco, Calif. Henry E. McGuckin, Jr.
University of Son Francisco James Dempsey
University of Coiifornia, Santo Barbara, Calif. Kathy Corey
South Alabama, Mobile, Alabama Howard Pelham
South Carolina, Columbia, S. C. Merrill G. Christophersen
South Dakota, Vermillion, S. D. James Lancaster
Southern California, Los Angeles, Calif. James McBath
Southern Methodist, Dallas, Texas Richard Sinzinger
Southwest Missouri State, Springfield, Mo. Richard Stovall
Spring Hill, Mobile, Ala. Bettie Hudgens
Stanford, Polo Alto, Calif. Kenneth Mosier
State Univ. of N.Y. at Albany, Albany, N.Y. Jeanine Rice
State Univ. of N.Y., Harpur (Zollege, Binghomton, N.Y Eugene Vasilew
Susquehanno, Selinsgrove, Pa. Larry D. Augustine
Syracuse, Syracuse, N.Y Paul Ray McKee
Tampa, Tampa, Florida Hugh Fellows
Temple, Philadelphia, Pa. Raiph Towne
Tennessee, Knoxville, Tennessee Norma C. Cook
Texas, Austin, Texas John Schunk
Texas Tech, Lubbock, Texas Vernon R. McGuire
Toledo, Toledo, Ohio Donald Terry
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Tulone, New Orleans, Lo. Ralph Caideroro
U. S. Naval Academy -
Ursinus, Collegeville, Pa
Utoh, Salt Loke City, Utah
Utah State, Logon, Utah . .
Voldostc State, Voldosto, Ga
Vonderbilt, Nashville, Tenn. _
Vermont, Burlington, Vt.
Virginio, Chorlottesvilie, Vo.
Virginia Polytechnic, Blacksburg, Vo.
Wabash, Crawfordsville, Ind.
Woke Forest, Winston-Solem, N.C. .. ...
Washington, Saint Louis, Mo. . _
Washington, Seattle, Wash, —
Washington and Jefferson, Washington, Po. .
Washington and Lee, Lexington, Vo.
Washington State, Pullman, Wash. -
Woyne Stote, Detroit, Michigan
Weber Stote, Ogden, Utah
Wesleyan, Middletown, Conn.
Western Kentucky State, Bowling Green, Ky.
Western Michigan, Kolamazoo, Michigan
Westminster, New Wilmington, Po.
West Virginio, Morgantown, W. Vo.
Whittier, Whittier, Calif.
Wichito Stote, Wichito, Kansas - . .
Willomette, Solem, Oregon
William ond Mary, Williomsburg, Va. .






Yale, New Haven, Conn. _
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